Abstract
Introduction
Colombia, like most Latin American countries immediately after the Second World War, used the import-substitution approach to development, immediately after the Second World War. In the case of agricultural products for export, a few cases agricultural production was used to generate export revenues. In such cases, agricultural production and exports production was were organized as in plantations, isolated from domestic markets. using Ttechnology used in these plantations was imported from abroad. Some Aagronomic practices and mechanical operations practices were introduced and adapted, as well as some organizational and administrative managerial methods to maximize cash returns. A typical example was banana production, managed by multinational companies. Later, during the early sixties, flower production and exports were organized in the same way, adapting foreign technology by investing domestic capital.
Food and raw material production for domestic use was divided among commercial producers who concentrated mainly on grains and cotton, and subsistence producers concentrated on growing mainly potato, tubers and some horticultural species.
Agricultural research for these two groups was largely financed and executed mainly by the public sector. However, since 1920 from the 1920s, several producersome farmer organizations have created special quotalevys or levies on output to finance part of the research process, mainly adaptive research. The trend toward farmer financial support to agricultural research, reached a peak around 1980.
Coffee was the The first industry where farmer financing of research and development (R&D) was employed, was coffee. In 1938 a highly specialized coffee experimental station was established by the Coffee Growers Association. In 1948, cotton producers began to finance activities related to the introduction and testing of commercial varieties. In 1963, a special rice quotalevy was approved by the Rice Grower Association to finance research and seed multiplication. Following the same model, In 1977 the sugarcane industry began funding in 1967 funded a national sugar research station, to combat a virus disease that was threatening local production. In 1985, the Cereal Producer Association (maize, wheat, barley) and the oil palm producers took the same approach followed by the of special quotas to finance both research and market interventions. In the early nineties flower, grape, and shrimp producers in the early 1990s. Table 1 summarizes information on the levy paid by producers, and the structure of each industry. association developed their own research infrastructures with their own resources.
This paper chapter summarizes the most successful of these various efforts by Colombian agricultural producers to finance research. Lessons learned from this Colombian experience on producer funded agricultural research is are presented and some implications for the future explored. In the final section the authors analyze the future context the private sector will have to play beyond the production paradigm.
2.

The Cases
Coffee
Coffee producers concluded that the only way to capture an emerging international market was the consolidation of supplies marketing in order to reduce transactions and transportation costs. An export quotalevy on exports, to be administered jointly by the national government and the producer association, was created established in 1934. Revenues from this levy were used to promote production, through credit, to build marketing and export infrastructure, and to finance a coffee research station. The Colombia government translated delegated all responsibilities related to agricultural research, production promotion, and export market development to the Coffee Producers' Association (FEDECAFE).
The export levy is administered by the National Congress of Coffee Producers. An annual budget is approved, which includes an appropriation for research of . In general terms aaround 12% of the collected revenues collected, although the from the export levy is allocated to research. However, the total amount varies from year to year, depending on the annual average coffee prices. However, iThe figures for specific allocations are not public. n general, However, the Director of Research argues that financial resources for research have been stable.
The resources allocated to research are administered by a smaller group, which acts as the Board of Directors Board of the experimental station. This group is formed by producer representatives from different coffeer regions. Administrators Managers of the coffee research program must present an annual work plan to the Board builted around projects. Since 1990, the annual research program has been discussed and validated with the municipal coffee regiona l committees, in order to detect respond to local demands. Table 1 contains summarized information of levy paid by producers, mean farm size of producers, the decision-making process of establishing a research agenda, and their effectiveness compared to the public sector.
Coffee research was has concentrated on the development of agronomic practices designed to improve grain product quality, a variable considered as strategic in the consolidation of international markets. Later, producers recognized the risk of rust disease and assigned resources to breeding rust-resistant varieties. In both cases, researchers were successful and coffee research was taken as a model for other industries.
Although no comprehensive evaluation of investment in research by FEDECAFE has been donemade, , several ex post analyses have been executed. T the impact of research is demonstrated by the cases of the coffee rust and the coffee berry borer case studies. In Colombia, coffee is grown in areas with cool climates that favo r rust development, which appeared for the first time To solve the problem of coffee rust, a resistant variety, 'Colombia', was developed in 1963. But obtaining a variety that tolerated the coffee berry borer proved impossible. Instead, its spread was arrested by implementing agronomic controls such as the collection of infected beans. Although the approach lowered on-station research costs, it represented higher extension costs.
Resisting coffee rust. The fungus Hemileia vastatrix, which causes coffee rust, appeared for the first time in the Americas in 1970 in Brazil. In Colombia, coffee is grown in areas with cool climates that favor rust development. To solve the problem of coffee rust, a resistant variety, 'Colombia', was developed and disseminated. To assess the impact of the disease in the field, plantations using chemical control were compared with plantations not treated. Production in the latter decreased between 14% under shade and 30% under full exposure (López et al. 1990 ). In controlled experiments, production decreased from 10.9% to 20.7% for local varieties receiving no rust control. Although rust reduced yields by 10-20% on local varieties, No significant difference was observed between the local varieties with chemical control and the the improved variety 'Colombia' receiving no control yielded the same as local varieties treated with fungicide. Table 2 shows how the disease The evolution of the disease and the rapid adoption of the improved variety with associated benefits is shown in Table 2 and Figure 1 . evolved and how farmers responded by planting the improved variety 'Colombia'. Graph 1 shows the results obtained with one of the cheapest chemical control methods. The internal rate of return to the research investment to 1994 varied between 12% and 31%, depending on the control method used.
The coffee berry borer, the major insect pest attacking coffee worldwide was detected in the Americas in 1913 in Brazil and has been causing serious problems in Colombia since its appearance in 1988 (Bustillo 1990) . In 1999, the borer was found in 400 municipalities, encompassing 380,000 coffee farms and 715,000 ha (Herrón 1998) . The borer, in addition to reducing coffee production by destroying the bean, also causes fruit to fall, increases the proportion of grain broken during processing, and alters beverage flavor. Development of a resistant variety was not possible so FEDECAFE accepted, as policy, to develop and use an integrated pest management system that included the collection of borer-infested beans, spraying coffee trees with the fungus Beauveria bassiana, and releasing the beetle Cephalonomia stephanoderis to attack the borer. Insecticide applications were to be used according to established infestation levels that are determined through periodic samplings. This program required considerable training of extension workers to disseminate. While the program had considerable impact, adoption was incomplete due to the complex set of practices involved.
Integrated management of the coffee berry borer. The coffee berry borer, Hypothenemus hampei (Ferrari), is the major insect pest attacking coffee worldwide . It was detected in the Americas in 1913 in Brazil and has been causing serious problems in Colombia since its appearance in 1988 (Bustillo 1990 ). In 1999, the borer was found in 400 municipalities, encompassing 380,000 coffee farms and 715,000 ha (Herrón 1998 ). The borer, in addition to reducing coffee production by destroying the bean, also causes fruit to fall, increases the proportion of grain broken during processing, and alters beverage flavor.
Development of a resistant variety was not possible so To control the pest while protecting the agroecological system, FEDECAFE accepted, as policy, to develop and use an integrated pest management system that included the collection of borer-infested beans (Re-Re), spraying coffee trees with the fungus Beauveria bassiana, and releasing the beetle Cephalonomia stephanoderis for disease control. Both the fungus and beetle to attack the borer. Insecticide applications were to be used according to established infestation levels that are determined by through periodic samplings. This program required considerable training of extension workers to disseminate. While the program had considerable impact, adoption was incomplete due to the complex set of practices involved.
To disseminate it extension workers were trained in the technology. In 1994, the groundwork was laid for conducting an ex post analysis of the impact of these pest control and coffee production practices. Four hundred coffee farms were monitored to assess the impact of several variables such as farm size, farmer's level of education, planting density, variety type, age of coffee plantation, shading versus full exposure, topped and free-growing coffee cultivation, attendance of training events, and extension advise. Although a formal study relating investment to benefits has not been conducted, available evidence shows the complexity of the situation when technology adoption, rather than involving the release of a new variety, requires changes in crop management and farmer behavior (Table 3) .
Rice
In 1963, rice producers followed the coffee model when. aA rice quotalevy, collected at the mill gate, was createdestablished. A large percentage of the rice quotalevy revenues was used to promote the use of improved varieties for irrigated rice, developed by the national research institution, now called CORPOICA, and the application of a technical package, based on the intensive use of fertilizers and other agro-chemicals, to control emerging pests and diseases. Multinationals firms protected by import licenses and controls, assembled the technical package. Import licenses and quotas protected domestic seed and agrochemical markets.
The rice levy is managed under a National Council which has equal representation from producers and government officials. The producer representatives are appointed by the Rice Producer Association and the government representatives are officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Planning Agency and the National Treasury. The revenues from this levy are distributed among research, transfer of technology, and marketing. The Rice Producer Association must present an annual program and budget that allocates resources across activities according to the relative severity of technical problems at the farm level and marketing bottlenecks.
The Rice Producer Association has experimental sites in all the main producing regions. Local farmers are invited to identify the major local constraints and problems and to evaluate the results. Consequently, the rice research agenda is no longer structured to meet a single national objective, but to confront local problems.
The rice levy for research have been used to address three interrelated objectives. First, they financed an extensive network of trials to adapt and evaluate advanced lines developed in the public national rice program. This program was aimed at obtaining high yielding varieties, as well as incorporating resistance to major pests and diseases. Second, the rice levy financed the development of a technological package, based on the use of agrochemicals to control weeds, a major constraint to rice production in tropical areas. Third, i t financed the establishment of a seed multiplication and distribution network.
The increased R&D made possible by the levyis was a success story. Rice production increased threefold from 1963 to 1983, and the domestic market was satisfied with cheaper, high quality rice. Rice agronomic practices, irrigation and harvesting were mechanized. An rice-input market developed able to attend meet the increasing demand for commercial inputs was established. It was claimed that the adoption of improve rice production technologies at the farm level was the dynamic force.
. National average yields jumped from 2.4 t/ha in 1963 to 4.2 t/ha in 1983. However, when Everything worked well until domestic production exceeded domestic consumption, the . At that point the national government was forced to implement subsidized market interventions, and . Internal rice ddomestic prices were tied to increasing production costs. Since 1983 rice production in Colombia has been stable, with an annual growth rate similar to human population growth. Colombian rice producers have been able to compete in the national market, but not in the international markets.
The rice case has been evaluated several times from the economic point of view. In all cases the results have been positive. Indicators such as the internal rate of return showed that this type of investment was profitable both from the private and social points of view. National average yields jumped from 2.4 t/ha in 1963 to 4.2 t/ha in 1983. Colombia rice domestic production tripled during the same period (FEDEARROZ, 1984) .
These evaluations have shown that both producers and consumers received positive benefits from the induced technical change. Producer profits increased due to larger total production and higher yields. Cons umers benefited from lower rice prices. One exception were the small subsistence upland rice producers, that were not able to adopt the new technology.
This rice quota is managed directly by the Rice Producer Association. There is a National Council with existing equal representation from producers and government officials. The producer representatives are appointed by the Rice Producer Association and the government representatives are officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Planning Agency and the National Treasury. The revenues from this levy has to be distributed among three main types of activities: Research, Transfer of Technology, and Marketing. The Rice Producer Association must present an annual program and budget. The distribution of revenues varies mainly for external factors such as technical problems at the farm level, marketing bottlenecks due to overproduction and the size of total collections.
The Rice Producer Association has experimental sites in all main producing regio ns. Local farmers are invited to identify the major local constraints and problems and to evaluate the results. As a consequence, the rice research agenda is no longer structured to meet a single national objective, but to confront local problems. In consequence the measurement of its impact is now more complex.
The rice quota revenues were used to address three interrelated objectives. First, they financed the adaptation and evaluation of new rice genetic materials that were developed in the public national rice program, through an extensive network of regional trials within the country. This program was aimed at obtaining high yielding varieties, which also had incorporated resistance to a major disease, piricularia orizea, and to a major pest, sogatodes oryzicolus. Second, the rice quota financed the development of a technological package, based on the use of agrochemicals to control tropical weeds, a major constraint to rice production in tropical areas. Third, it financed the establishment of a seed multiplication and distribution network.
Since 1983 rice production in Colombia has been stable, with an annual growth rate similar to human population growth. Colombian rice producers have been able to compete in the national market, but not in the international markets. With the collapse of the national publicsector rice research program in the late 1980s, [is this the correct year? YES] it has been was necessary to use part of the rice quotalevy to finance more upstream basic research, in collaboration with several international rice research programs.
In 1995, Colombia promoted the creation of a Latin American Irrigated Rice Research Fund (FLAR). This fund has allowed the continuation and strengthening of the irrigated rice research in the arearegio n. Nine Latin American countries make annual contributions to the fund, on the basis of their national rice production-in the case of Colombia, through the rice levy. A Technical Committee and an Administrative Council govern the fund; both of them formed by representatives of each country member country. An annual research agenda is negotiated among all members.
In order to speed operations and to improve efficiency, FLAR has made a strategic alliance with a major international rice program based at the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT). This alliance allows FLAR to have access to the international nurseries and to use the research facilities at CIAT headquarters.
After five years of operation FLAR is showing concrete results. In most countries new varieties have been delivered. These varieties are adapted to the biological and physical constraints of each country. Also, training has been a very important instrument to improve the managerial efficiency of all producers.
The impacts of the Colombian rice research program have been evaluated several times and in all cases the results have been positive. Indicators such as the internal rate of return showed that the investment was profitable both from the private and social points of view. These evaluations have also shown that both producers and consumers received positive benefits from the rapid technical change. However, subsistence-oriented upland rice producers, that were not able to adopt the new technology, suffered losses due to lower prices.
Sugar
The Colombian Sugarcane Research Center (CENICAÑA) was founded in 1977 to contribute to the development of the Colombian sugar industry. This center is financed through levy funds paid by the eleven sugar mills and 1,400 individual sugar producers who form the Colombian Association of Sugar Producers (ASOCAÑA) by means of parafiscal funds. The annual budget allocated to CENICAÑA represents 0.55% of total sugar sales and has averaged about US$ 2.54 million dollars per year during the 1977-97 year period. This budget has been increasing during the last 5 five years as a result of the expansion in planted area (Table 34 and Graph Figure 2 ). In addition, the percentage of total sales allocated to CENICAÑA is expected to increase to 0.70% during the next three years (CENICAÑA, 1998) .
The research agenda has been historically established by the owners of the sugar industry, represented by a board of trustees of 12 members (one for each of the eleven sugar mills and one representing the sugar producers). The backbone of the research agenda has been the development of improved varieties with increasing sugar content, reduced harvest timeearlier maturity (i.e, closer to 12 months), and resistance to economically important diseases. During the last 10 years, emphasis has also been placed on the development of varieties which defoliate and that are erect in order to facilitate the mechanical harvesting mechanically (CENICAÑA, 1998) .
This research agenda has resulted in the introduction, validation, and development of several improved varieties which have significantly improved the performance of the sugar industry during the plast 21 years, increasing productivity by 71%, reducing harvest time by 43%, and increasing sucrose content in cane by more than 7% (Table 4 ). All these factors have made the industry more competitive, resulting in a 54% increase in planted area from 122,000 ha to 188,000 ha.
These changes in productivity as a result of research investment ha ves produced important benefits to the industry which are estimated to be around US$266 (million dollars from an $53 million investment of $53 million, which gives an internal rate of return of about 276.6% (Graph Figure 2) . It is expected that the benefits will continue to increase as the remaining planted area to sugarcane (i.e., 39%) is replaced with newer superior varieties developed by CENICAÑA which are superior to current ones.
Oilpalm
The case study of the Colombian Oilpalm Research Center (CENIPALMA) is analyzed for the period 1990 to 1999 (CENIPALMA, 2000) . The main results are summarized in Table 5 and the conclusions derived from this analysis are: (a)Research funds for CENIPALMA also comes from parafiscal levy funds, which are equivalent to 0.5% of the total va lue of production. These funds are complemented with marginal small allocations from other investors which represent about 10% of parafiscal levy funds. Most of the research agenda is executed in private plantations and according to the agenda is priorities established based on by a technical advisory committee with experts from the production and processing sides. The governance of this fund initially was similar to CENICAÑA, meaning that the government did not have any representation. However, due to the fa ct that the collection of the levy was difficult to enforce, and that the legal status of the fund impeded access to other public sources of funding, oil palm producers requested the promulgation of a public law, similar to the rice law. [what does this do? Based on this law, CENIPALMA was able to access parafiscal funds, but the government had the power to supervise and control the funds being collected as well as to participate in the allocation of these funds]. Currently the government has a limited representation in the main governance body of the fund.
Oil palm producers created their own research institute, CENIPALMA. The institute has its own Executive Committee, whose main responsibility is to approve and supervise the annual research programmeprogram. During its first years, CENIPALMA was a 'virtual institute' since the research was implemented in the fields and laboratories of other research centers and universities. Recently CENIPALMA has built a specialized biotechnology laboratory and acquired two experimental fields. Currently CENIPALMA is negotiating with the national government the custody of the oil palm national germplasm bank.
Research expenditures on oil palm grew at a rate of 22% per year between 1990 and 1999 and 89% of these resources came from oil palm producers (Table 45 ). Most of these funds were allocated to the development of integrated pest and disease management and soil improvement practices, which contributed to signifficant increases in productivity (i.e., from 13.0 to 17.4 mt/ha (; Table 45 ). It has been in these two areas where most (81.1%) over 80%) of the returns to research have been obtained (CENIPALMA, 2000) .
(d)Research investment contributed to changes in the the production pattern of the oil palm industryproduction. During the 1980's, industry growth (ie., 12% per year) was largely explained by an increase in the use of capital and labor. However, Dduring the 1990's industry growth (ie., 9.3% per year) was explained by an increase in productivity (i.e., labor use only increased 2.9% per year and capital use increased 3.0% per year compared to output growth of nearly 10% per year).
Increases in planted area and yield were accompanied by a greater efficiency in the use of labor. In 1980 6.12 ha of oilpalm were ma naged per worker and this relationship in 1999 was 7.12 : 1.
These technological changes increased production by 1.53 million tons during the period 1990-99. If this productivity change had not occurred, Colombia would now be importing 186,000 mt/year of vegetable oil compared to the . During 1999 Colombia exported 109,000 mt it exported in 1999.
The governance of this parafiscal fund initially was similar to CENICAÑA, meaning that the government did not have any representation. However, due to the fact that the collection of the levy was difficult to enforce, and that the legal status of the fund imposed access to other financial public sources, oilpalm producers requested the promulgation of a public law, similar to the rice law. Currently the government has a limited representation in the main governance body of the fund.
Oilpalm producers created their own research institute, CENIPALMA. The institute has its own Executive Committee, whose main responsibility is to approve and supervise the annual research agenda. During the first years CENIPALMA was a virtual institute. The research agenda was implemented in the fields and laboratories of other research centers and universities. Recently CENIPALMA has built a specialized biotech laboratory and has acquired two experimental fields. Currently CENIPALMA is negotiating with the national government the custody of the oilpalm national germplasm bank.
Oil palm production has been developed in on large private commercial plantations. But sSince 1990, CENIPALMA has been is promoting production in small farms through the creation of community-owned extraction palms and collective marketing. The goal is that in 10 or 15 years total oilpalm production will be equally done in large plantations and small farms. Small producers are expected to pay the oil palm levy.
Lessons Learned
The private sector, mostly farmers but also processors, invested in areas where research and technology transfer could quickly obtain a return on investment either by increasing yields or reducing production costs. The profitability for the privately-sector funded-research was higher because the most expensive investment was allocated by publicly-funded institutions. This can be demonstrated by the following arguments: 3.1 Human resources. Non-Government Organizations (NGO's) and the private sector employ about one-third of all research scientists in Colombia . However, Tthese individuals were educated and trained by the Colombian Institute of Agriculture (ICACORPOICA or its predecessor organizations). Trained personnel is the single most important research cost, and has represent inged between 56% and 70% of the total cost of privately-funded research since 1986 (Beintema et al., 1999) .
3.2 Investment areas. The private sector concentrated its research in annual crops in order to get returns to investment in the shortest period of time and where scientists had more experience. Nearly two thirds was allocated to testing and validation of new crop varieties and only 1% is allocated to research on natural resources (Beintema et al., 2000) . About 86.4% of scientists worked in annual crops, 7.5% in perennial crops, 3.4% in post-harvest losses and handling, 1.7% in livestock, and 1% in management of natural resources. Of total private-funded research costs, 63% was allocated to testing and validation of new crop varieties (Beintema et al., 1999 ).
3.3 Low interest in forming strategic alliances with public-funded research. When the Colombian Institute for Agricultural Research (CORPOICA) was created by the government in 1993 it was expected that a significant amount of research funds would come from be provided by the private sector. However, during the plast 5 five years this amount has represented less than 4% of the total operational costs of CORPOICA (Beintema et al., 1999) . Thus, tThere is little incentive for the private sector to form a strategic alliance with CORPOICA because it implies a higher cost with lower probability of capturing the benefits of research. Any research product coming out of CORPOICA is public even if funds come from the private sector.
3.4 Low investment in technology transfer. The private sector has been reluctant to support collective efforts at technology transfer because large producers h ave easy access to information through their own sources. This type of extension should be concentrated on small producers, which have high social benefits but low private returns to investment. Efforts by the National Program of Technology Transfer (PRONATTA) to stimulate the private sector to establish strategic alliances for technology transfer have shown little impact. This is proven by the fact that oOnly 1.7% of all PRONATTA projects are currently being executed with the private sector (PRONATTA, 1998).
3.5 Low investment in the analysis of the distribution of benefits among producers. For many years it was accepted that the greatest benefit to research was related to derived from lower consumer prices and little emphasis was given to the analysis of benefit distribution among producers. The private sector argued this that distributional issues were was a responsibility of the public sector. However, studies have shown that rural poverty has been significantly increaseding during the last 20 years, which justifies the analysis of mechanisms for a better distribution of benefits among producers.
Critical Issues To Face In The Future
Research & Development Challenges
Private investment in agricultural R&D activities will face several challenges in the near future. On one hand, wWith the globalization of the agricultural markets, the profitability productivity criteria will have to be complemented with other parameters such as product acceptability and efficiency within the agricultural f ood chain. Also, emerging international trade restrictions derived from the sustainable use and preservation of natural resources will call for a research agenda that could meet simultaneously land intensification and environmental health objectives. Finally, it is expected that agricultural R&D activities will help to alleviate poverty and reduce income inequalities, through the creation of new investment opportunities, which must have a bias towards the use of the most abundant production factor, labor. This last challenge calls for a large portfolio of agricultural R&D activities financed with will require a significant investment of private funds. Private funding has been mainly addressed to establish crops. New investments are needed specially in tropical fruits and forestry.
The main constraint faced by private investors is the steady continuing weakness of the overall agricultural research system within Colombia. Public funds play an important role in providing the basic and strategic research output s, upon which to increase payoffs to private investments acted as complementary. Similarly, most scientific human resources were formed trained in public universities and in public research institutions. The private sector has been able to draw from this stock the most talented and promising researchers. However, due to current fiscal restrictions and the new government role, as facilitator and coordinator, theseis sources are is being depleted. at rapid rates. Therefore, private investments in basic research and human development will be a be needed and appropriate incentives need to be put in place. In consequence, national and local governments will be forced to create policies and instruments aimed to create the proper incentives for such kind of investments.
Development of social capital.
The crisis of the agricultural sector has has been useful to demonstrated how fragile is the social capital existing in the rural sector and how easy it was destroyed with the trade liberalization policy i mplemented by Colombia since the early 90's. Besides the low economic returns obtained from the agricultural sector, the greatest impact was produced by the destruction of social capital that generated trust and confidence among bankers, entrepreneurs, marketing agents, technical support people, and producer organizations. Five decisions lead to this situation: created a large turmoil and destroyed the little social capital that existed:
Urban bias in government services: 4.2.1 Support for the urban sector in detriment of the rural sector. The Colombian government was conscious that an overvalued exchange rate would have a large negative impact on rural income. In effect, the Colombian peso was overvalued at a rate of 8.2% per year between 1990 and 1997 which caused a reduction in real agricultural prices (Table 6 ). Tand the planted area to agricultural crops was reduced by more than one1 million hectares ha during the same period. The decision to maintain an overvalued exchange rate sent a clear message to the rural sector indicating that the priority was to support the large entrepreneurial industrial and service conglomerates related to services and importation and not the generation of rural employment.
Short payback periods on agricultural loans.
With an average annual inflation rate during the 1990's of 20% and real interest rates of 15%, all medium and long-term agricultural loans were, in practice, paid back under in an environment of price reduction in real terms declining real prices and climatic disasters. These conditions forced producers to pay penalty interests on overdue loans, which were close to 1 one billion dollars. Many producers lost their farms.
Low government support to the cooperative movement.
During the 90's the financial system was re-capitalized with help from the Colombian government by more than 2 billion dollars but the agriculture cooperative system received no support whatsoever.
Decreasing land prices and collateral.
The overvalued exchange rate caused a reduction in real prices of most agricultural commodities, which in turn caused a declined in land prices. With overdue loans, the financial system began to receive farms as payment in-kind for loans that were financially impossible to be paid back by producers. This situation induced the financial system to stop accepting farm land as collateral for future loans, thus leaving small and medium producers without of financing opportunities, which in turn deepened the crisis of in the agricultural sectore even more.
Destruction of existing strategic alliances.
Strategic alliances were formed between producer organizations and other segments of the agroindustrial chain during the late 1980's. These alliances were destroyed during the 1990's and were substituted by more fragile agreements, which have proven unstable. [why and how. With these alliances the industry agreed to buy the national crops, and producers had more access to credit . However, with freetrade agreements starting in the early 90's, these alliances were eliminated by the industry since they were free to buy raw materials anywhere in the world without any agreements. This situation occurred with cotton, sorghum, corn, and rice. THHEREFORETherefore, given the insecurity of the internal market, the financial system reduced the amount of credit allocated. This situation forced producers to make individual agreements with input suppliers which then bought the crop from producers at prices determined at harvest time. For most crops this new scheme did not work, inducing the producers to experience higher transactions costs. 1 (dr. Nestor gutierrez, ceo, national rice federation of colombia, personal communication) ] and were substituted by more fragile agreements, which have proven unstable. These transaction costs have been passed on to t The weaker partners of these agreements, which are the producers, experience higher transactions costs in input and output marketing as a result.
ThereforeAs a result of these trends, the current agricultural production systems do not have the capacity to generate the necessary surplus capital needed to modernize agriculture or to move to crops that are more capital-intensive that could generate more employment. In addition, the systematic reduction in real incomes of most producers implies they are not able to allocate resources to co-finance this modernization process.
Efficiency in the allocation of resources.
The level of long-term international competitiveness is based on the capacity of the productive system to incorporate new technologies and to allocate reserve funds to withstand low price cycles and climatic adversity. In addition, the private sector needs to consider the externalities caused by the effects of their production systems and detect those areas where marginal investment in natural resource management will contribute to maintain long-term competitiveness.
Small producers are not able to make this change by themselves and require the support of other sectors of society to help them in the efficient administration of these resources through strategic alliances. In addition, it is required:
(a)The allocation of resources in the rural sector in those areas where it is profitable to do it; (b)The reduction in production costs and the increase in farm size, but only in those agricultural activities with economies of scale that allow a trickle-down effect to the poor; (c)The generation of employment, but giving opportunities to the poor in order to achieve the greatest social benefits; and (d) A good administrator that will assign the resources efficiently.
All these efforts This will require research to identify the best-bet opportunities and to obtain the greatest benefit from available resources. Source: FEDECAFE, cited by Farfán (1999) . Source: Jaramillo and de Angel (1999) . 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 Year Millions of pesos (1985) Developing the variety 
